Faith-based organisations, local governance and citizenship in South Africa by Piper, Laurence








POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA has replaced the racist oligarchy of
apartheid with a liberal-democratic Constitution and political institutions
at national, provincial and local levels. In addition, the government has
tried to accommodate indigenous practices of  participatory democracy
at local level through the new structures of  ward committees and
processes of  public consultation on development planning and the
budget. Unfortunately, these spaces were implemented belatedly in
response to public protest and remain mostly ineffective. Furthermore,
civil society tends to be either disengaged from the local state, or
sufficiently enraged to protest against it. This emergent estrangement
of  the local state from society is fostering forms of  citizenship that are
either indifferent or ambivalent towards the state.
In response to this scenario, this chapter argues that democracy and
development require more constructive state-society relations, something
like Andrea Cornwall and Vera Schattan Coelho’s ‘participatory sphere’
(2007), and that this implies more engaged and active forms of  citizenship
in local governance. Moreover, it holds that faith-based organisations
could make a significant contribution to realising these democratic ends
because of both the quantity and quality of religious identification and
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organisation. Not only are most South Africans religious, indeed Christian,
but there are multiple faith-based organisations, many of  which have
significant social power. This makes the faith-based sector potentially
one of  the most powerful components of  civil society in South Africa,
as well as in Africa and other postcolonial regions.
Although there is widespread recognition of  the separation of  church
and state in South Africa, as reflected in the Constitution, this is not a
barrier to faith-based support for human rights, democracy and
development. This is because the dominant distinction embraced in the
political theology of  the major religions is one that distinguishes support
for community or social objectives, such as democracy and development,
from politics, largely understood as party competition for power. What
this means is that although there is a tradition of  liberation theology in
South Africa, it is not necessary to appeal to this tradition to justify
faith-based advocacy for an active, democratic citizenship.
Lastly, this mainstream political theology is important precisely
because it is rooted in a religious normative scheme embraced by ordinary
people in their political attitudes and alternative to the tremendous
political legitimacy enjoyed by ruling elites. However, a substantive
application of  political theology to the domain of  democratic and social
development is still required.
Democracy, local government and public participation
In 1994 South Africa had its first election in which all citizens were
entitled to vote, regardless of  race. The African National Congress (ANC)
led by Nelson Mandela won with an overwhelming 62.65 per cent of  the
national poll. The National Party (NP) of  F.W. de Klerk, the party that
had overseen apartheid rule, was placed second with 20 per cent of  the
ballot. This election followed four years of  intense negotiations between
South Africa’s political parties led by the ANC and NP, which mostly
focused on the process towards and the form of  the post-apartheid
state. While the end-point of  these negotiations was the Constitution of
1996, by 1994 the basic frame of  the new order was in place. Central to
the post-apartheid order was a unitary, non-racial, democratic state, in
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which the Constitution, including a Bill of  Rights, was sovereign, and
the government was to be constituted by regular elections conducted in
terms of  a proportional representation, party-list system. Although
unitary, the state was divided into national, provincial and local spheres
with distinct powers for each, albeit somewhat limited for the two latter
levels. National policy and legislation took precedence over provincial
or local government.
The power of  the national sphere has been greatly enhanced by
another factor: the overwhelming electoral dominance of  the ANC. That
the ANC is massively and increasingly popular is confirmed by every
election result since 1994. Indeed, in 2004, it gained more than 70 per
cent of  the national vote and, for the first time, won all nine of  the
provinces. Notably, this growing popularity sits hand-in-glove with a
greater concentration of  power. For example, Tom Lodge (1999) points
to a growing centralisation in ANC processes; Adam Habib and Rupert
Taylor (1999) discuss the growing dominance of  the ANC in the tripartite
alliance; Robert Mattes (2002) refers to the rise of  executive power at
the expense of parliament; and Anthony Butler (2000) notes the con-
centration of  executive function in the office of  the president. When
added to perceptions about former President Thabo Mbeki’s ‘zero-sum
approach to power, viewing alternative sites of  capacity as competitors
rather than potential resources’ (Butler 2000: 200), the overall trend seems
clear.
The significance of  the ANC’s power for democracy in South Africa
is read in two divergent ways. On the one hand, there are observers who
believe ‘that only an extended period of  political stability can establish
the preconditions for the longer-term entrenchment of  democracy’
because of  the tremendous social and economic divisions that characterise
society (Butler 2004: 118). Thus any threat to ANC dominance is a threat
to political stability. The contrary view is that ANC dominance is harmful
to democratic consolidation. Those to the centre-right of  the political
spectrum hold that the lack of  a viable opposition will encourage
authoritarian tendencies in the government, the fusion of  party and state,
and thus the progressive erosion of  autonomous institutions and
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conditions for political competition (Giliomee and Simkins 1999: 337–
40). Such sentiments have come to the fore in the ANC succession race,
and Mbeki has been accused of  using state institutions to exclude his
rival for power. Similar views are expressed by those on the left. For
example, the South African Communist Party (SACP) Deputy Secretary-
General Jeremy Cronin has noted the ANC’s ‘swings between dema-
goguery and managerialism’, warning of  ‘terrible perils for democracy’
and that ‘[Robert] Mugabe epitomises where we could end up’ (quoted
in Malala 1998).
In short, as with other liberation movements in Africa, India and
Mexico, the ANC’s record as liberation movement has ensured its victory
as political party. Although there have been clear tensions over its key
policy choices, including macro-economic policy, HIV and AIDS and crime,
the response from both ANC activists and the public, until recently, has
been to try to change the ANC, rather than supporting or forming another
party. When added to the centralised design of  the political system, the
dominant party practice in South Africa further concentrates power at
national, rather than local, level. Hence, the ANC candidate who ultimately
leads a municipality is a decision made at provincial and sometimes
national level in the party.
Local government
Despite this effective centralisation of  power, the significance of  post-
apartheid local government is enhanced for three reasons. First, not only
does each sphere of  government have developmental responsibilities of
its own, but local government is the key institution used by national
government to deliver basic services, such as electricity, water and (most)
housing. Second, local government is the only sphere that does not have
a simple proportional representation system, as half  of  all local councillors
are elected from constituencies. This makes it the only sphere of
government in which citizens can identify an individual politician who is
directly accountable to them. When this is added to the tendency of
most citizens not to differentiate responsibility according to each sphere
of  government, disproportionate expectations are placed on ward
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councillors to meet people’s needs. Third, and perhaps most importantly
for our purposes, local government is required to operate more
democratically than the other spheres, by facilitating public participation
in municipal processes between elections. Notably, versions of  popular
democracy similar to this are now emerging again in contemporary
political theory, for instance in the recent debates about deliberative
democracy. This is typically explained as a response to the divergence
between the democratic beliefs and values of  ordinary citizens and the
sharply elite character of  rule under liberal-democratic capitalism. The
idea that pluralist or liberal democracy is experiencing some kind of
democratic deficit is increasingly widespread.
However, public participation in South African local governance also
has clear local roots. As Steven Friedman points out, the idea of  public
participation in local government has connections with notions of  ‘people
power’, as expressed in the opposition politics to apartheid of  the 1980s
(2005). Of  particular importance here was the experience of  participation
in civic and other community-based organisations in historically black
areas. Indeed, according to Yunus Carrim, member of  parliament and
chair of  the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Local Government
that drew up the key legislation on public participation in local
government, the Municipal Systems Act of  2000, the framers of  this
legislation were almost all former civic and United Democratic Front
(UDF) activists, who would have been familiar with the idea of
participatory democracy (interview, 26 October 2006). While clearly not
the only political practice inherited by the reconstituted ANC after 1990,
this participatory strain is still manifest in South African politics and, in
particular, in the design of  local governance.
The failure of participatory governance
The first reference to participation in post-apartheid local government
is to be found in the South African Constitution of  1996.1  The White
Paper on Local Government of  1998 suggests that ‘municipalities should
develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in policy initiation
and formulation, and the monitoring and evaluation of  decision-making
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and implementation’ (DPLG 1998: section 3.3, 17–20). However, it was
really only with the Municipal Structures Act of  1998 and especially the
Municipal Systems Act of  2000 that participatory local governance was
given institutional life. Where the Structures Act sets out the various
structures of  local government, including ward committees, the Systems
Act outlines how they are to be used. More specifically, section 16 obliges
municipalities to ‘develop a culture of  municipal governance that
complements formal representative government with a system of
participatory governance’.
What precisely is ‘participatory governance’? There are basically three
aspects: the definition of  municipality; ward committees; and consultative
processes for planning, budgeting and the like. The first of  these is in
some ways the most remarkable and yet intangible. The Systems Act defines
the municipality as consisting of  the governing structures (the elected
councillors), the administration (the appointed staff ) and the residents.
Carrim claims that the definition of  residents as part of  the municipality
is unique in the world and establishes the grounds for greater involvement
by the public in municipal matters (interview, 26 October 2006). While
the practical implications of  this definition are not yet obvious, the
symbolic ramifications are considerable.
The second innovation is the ward committee system. The Systems
Act provides for ward committees to be established in each ward of  a
Category A (metropole) or Category B (city or town) municipality, if  the
municipality so chooses, although the government has also suggested
that the ward committee system be made compulsory for all municipalities
(Msengana-Ndlela 2006). Chaired by the ward councillor, ward com-
mittees are intended to consist of  up to ten people representing ‘a diversity
of  interests’ in the ward, with women ‘equitably represented’. Ward
committees may make recommendations on any matter affecting their
wards to the ward councillor or through the ward councillor, to the
metro or local council, the executive committee, the executive mayor
and so on. Notably, ward committees cannot be delegated executive
powers, and their primary function is to ‘create formal unbiased
communication channels . . . between the community and the council’
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(DPLG 2005: 36). They are also required to mobilise the community to
participate in service payment campaigns, development planning and
budgetary processes, decisions about service provision, by-laws and so
on.
The third aspect of  participatory governance involves forms of  public
participation in core municipal processes, such as development planning,
performance management, performance, the budget and strategic
decisions relating to services (section 16[1][a] of  the Systems Act ). In
short, public participation is statutorily injected into the most important
municipal processes. Government policy on how public consultation on
these issues ought to occur is quite limited and usually manifest in the
insistence on using ward committees. In practice, it seems, most
consultation happens through the use of  public meetings called by the
mayor, also known by their isiZulu name, mayoral izimbizo (public
meetings).
Unfortunately, these government spaces for public participation do
not seem to be working. A range of  empirical studies has suggested that
comparatively few people participate in ward committees or izimbizo
and, more importantly, the forums have virtually no impact on local
decision-making or deliberation (see Barichievy, Piper and Parker 2005;
Friedman 2005; Piper and Deacon 2006; Piper and Nadvi 2007; Piper
and Von Lieres 2008). According to Laurence Piper and Bettina Von
Lieres (2008) this is because the top-down ‘invited spaces’ of  participatory
governance are poorly implemented, poorly designed (such that they do
not create incentives for real participation) and poorly supported by key
political elites. Simply put, despite the tradition of  participatory politics,
politicians do not really want public participation to work – at least not
yet. Indeed, despite the fact that the Systems Act was passed in 2000, it
was only following popular protests against local government in the year
preceding the local government elections of  2006 that national
government started implementing participatory governance with any
urgency. In late 2005, the Minister of  Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula,
reported to parliament that there had been 5 085 protests against local
government countrywide, related to issues such as poor service delivery
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in the previous year (Daily News, 14 October). Nevertheless, most
provinces still do not have developed public participation policies for
local government and the national policy is yet to be finalised.
Civil society as enraged or disengaged
The failure of  the ‘invited spaces’ of  participatory governance reflects
what appears to be a deeper, emergent problem in local state-society
relations: the estrangement of  the local state from civil society. As Richard
Ballard, Adam Habib and Imraan Valodia note, democratisation had a
demobilising effect on South African civil society (2006: 14–17). Civil
society activism was channelled into anti-apartheid activity in the 1980s,
mostly under the hegemony of  the ANC, which was the dominant social
movement in the country. After the 1994 elections, the movements that
mobilised people were absorbed into the ANC government or into
partnerships with the government, and most held the view that the
government would deliver to the poor (see Heller 2001). Furthermore,
the remaining non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector came under
pressure to ‘professionalise’ and withdraw from advocacy to a more
limited role in service delivery (see Greenstein 2003).
From the late 1990s, however, there has been a rebirth in oppositional
civil society, although only some of  this is framed in terms contrary to
the ‘emerging pro-growth consensus’, while much is framed in broader
rights-based opposition (Ballard, Habib and Valodia 2006: 400). Notably,
while there is no neat division between those movements that will engage
with the state and those that will not, the counter-hegemonic movements’
engagements ‘tend to create crises, which more rights-based campaigns
can capitalise on to influence policy and government practice’ (404).
Critically, however, opposition civil society is not particularly strong, and
hence Jo Beall argues that emergent state-society relations exist in a kind
of  ‘fragile stability’ that is likely to continue into the medium term until
new social actors emerge to change this equilibrium (2005: 681).
Recent empirical work around the country has painted a picture of
an ambivalent civil society, which is either enraged or disengaged. The
enraged segment refers to social movements, such as the Soweto
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Electricity Crisis Committee or the Abahlali Basemjondolo Housing
Movement in eThekwini, which have publicly organised and protested
the lack of  delivery of  the local state. As noted, this segment is quite
small and exists in some real political tension with the ruling ANC party.
Conversely, the disengaged segment refers to the bulk of  civil society,
especially the NGO sector, which tends to ignore the local state, both
because of  its comparative lack of  powers and high levels of  dis-
organisation, and because of  the local state’s lack of  interest in meaningful
partnership (see Piper and Nadvi 2007: 31–33). For most of  civil society,
a relationship with the local state is largely non-existent.
In this context, the implications for citizenship are not positive. On
the one hand, citizenship tends to be understood in terms of  social
agency for one’s community against the democratic state; on the other
hand, citizenship is constructed in terms of  social agency without or
despite the state. Hence, recent survey research into the attitudes of  554
young people in eThekwini found a clear distinction between the notions
of  ‘government’ and ‘community’, such that only 36 per cent agreed
that government was working to solve community problems (only 16
per cent trusted political leaders), while 59 per cent trusted school leaders
and 57 per cent trusted community organisations (Brundige 2007: 83–
84). Furthermore, while only 41 per cent reported following national
politics, 69 per cent reported following community events (99). In general,
young people defined citizenship in terms of  community work (roughly
50 per cent), rather than rights (1.8 per cent) or political actions (10 per
cent) (102–03).
In many ways, this youth dissatisfaction with government and the
conceptual disengagement of  government from community are more
evidence for the familiar refrain in the public domain of  an emergent
political class pursuing its own interests in the name of  the people, but
often at the expense of  the people. It is a kindred sentiment to that
which underwrites the appeal of  Jacob Zuma as ‘of  the people’ in a way
that Mbeki is not. To my mind, it represents a desire for a return to the
ANC as a social movement rooted in the community from its new and
alien role as a professional party serving political elites. However, should
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imminent change in ANC leadership not make the local state more
responsive to local people, communities will be forced either to disengage
from the local state and to seek relationships with other players (such as
international donors) or grow increasingly enraged to force the state to
deliver.
The case for active citizenship through a participatory sphere
It is quite possible, perhaps even likely, that South Africa will continue
along the liberal-democratic trajectory of  regular elections and market
economic growth without significant forms of  public participation in
the future. It might even be the case that this trajectory is largely successful,
growing the middle classes and keeping political elites reasonably
responsive to the people over time. However, it seems equally plausible
that this trajectory will not optimise the developmental and democratic
potential of  South Africa’s people, especially the poor. A better option
would be to combine the broad liberal-democratic framework with a
social project that includes constructive state-society relations centred
on the idea of  an active citizenship that engages the government through
a ‘participatory sphere’.
According to Cornwall and Coelho, democratic state-society relations
require a ‘participatory sphere’ that lies at the interface of  the public
sphere and the state. Composed of  hybrid institutions, some of  which
are extensions of  the ‘invited spaces’ of  the state and some of  which are
‘invented spaces’ claimed from the state, these institutions have ‘a semi-
autonomous existence, outside and apart from the institutions of  formal
politics and everyday associational life . . . They are spaces of  contestation,
but also of  collaboration and co-operation’ (2007: 1). The point of  this
autonomy is precisely to open space for the greater inclusion, voice and
impact of  otherwise marginalised citizens, usually the poor, on local
governance.
Further, public participation promises to enhance economic and social
development. In this regard, it is notable that local participation and
decentralisation have become crucial elements of  the dominant
developmental model employed by the World Bank, United Nations
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and other agencies over the last twenty years. In terms of  participation,
the World Bank contrasts its previous ‘external expert stance’, where
development project sponsors and designers were outside the local system
about which they took decisions, with the new ‘participatory stance’.
The latter involves not only consulting and listening to local people and
being open to local innovation, but also local people directly participating
in project decision-making (World Bank 1996: 3–5). Experience has
shown that meaningful public participation in development projects
generates better outcomes, partly because of  better informed and quality
deliberation, but also because of  better support for projects through co-
ownership. Hence one benefit of  participation is better delivery due to
projects that are better conceived and implemented.
Other reasons for participation include its democratic dividends. This
is articulated by new ‘deliberative’ or ‘discursive’ theories of  democracy,
unhappy with reducing democracy to periodic elections (Cohen 2002).
Where some see public participation as enhancing democracy through
uncovering new voices in informal or ‘wild’ spaces where communication
is unconstrained and spontaneous (Dryzek 2005), others see deliberation
as implying new structures to enhance deliberation and so deepen
democracy in existing public institutions (Hendricks 2006). Key advocates
of  the latter approach are Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2001) in
their analysis of  the features of  ‘Empowered Deliberative Democracy’
(EDD) institutions.
Of  course, the preconditions for deliberative democracy are not
present in every context. As noted above, in South Africa there is little
evidence of  a democratic public sphere in which citizens can engage
effectively with the state. There is often a marked disconnect between
public spaces in which citizens voice their claims and the political sphere
of  the state and its institutions. This disconnect is embedded in a wider
political culture that brings together democratic and clientelist elements,
often overlain by complex identity politics in terms of  race, ethnicity
and gender. In these postcolonial contexts, political culture is shaped by
often messy negotiations between old and new governance structures in
post-authoritarian contexts. Consequently, there may be little convergence
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between local democratic culture and state-driven culture. For instance,
traditional authority and constitutional democracy in South Africa coexist
in complex ways.
Notably, the support for deliberation or deliberative institutions is
echoed by associative democratic theories of  consolidation, which point
to the central role of  civil society as a counterbalance to state hegemony.
In so far as new democratic institutions enhance civil society’s influence
over the state, they are seen as good for democracy. This is especially the
case for those who see the electoral dominance of the ANC in South
Africa as effectively constituting a ‘dominant party system’, with the
associated threats of  unchallenged elite rule (Mattes 2002). Indeed, as I
will argue below, it is precisely because of  the complex, messy and
contradictory nature of  state-society relations that faith-based organ-
isations are so important.
The potential of  faith-based organisations to enliven local
democracy and active citizenship
The argument for the potential role of  faith-based organisations in
building active citizenship is one that appeals to both the quantity and
quality of  such organisations. In terms of  quantity, I want to draw
attention both to the religious nature of most South Africans and the
huge number of  existing faith-based organisations, many of  which have
significant social influence. As is the case throughout the postcolonial
world, faith offers a tremendous resource for social organisation often
not tapped into for socio-political ends. Related to this, the quality of
these religious organisations in South Africa is fairly conducive to
advocacy for more democratic forms of  citizenship. Despite the
widespread recognition of  the separation of  religion and state, most
mainstream churches have embraced a political theology that affirms
human rights, democracy and development as social goods independent
from partisan political competition. Hence, while church leaders do not
tell their congregations who to vote for, they can advocate for human
rights and social development. Importantly, the churches have an
additional strength that other progressive civil society organisations do
not: a source of  normative authority as doing God’s work as an alternative
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to the political legitimacy of  popular support, often claimed by civil
society organisations, but still largely associated with ruling elites. This
authority is especially important in contexts, such as Africa, where
ordinary people understand politics in religious terms, too.
Religion and quantity
The significance of  religion and faith-based organisations for public life
is increasingly recognised around the world. There are various reasons
for this, including what Samuel Huntington calls the ‘clash of  civilisations’
(1993). This is a view contrary to Francis Fukuyama and company who
hold that we live at ‘the end of  history’ where liberal-democratic capitalism
is not only hegemonic, but also optimal for human development and
therefore a stable and enduring system (Fukuyama 2002). Against this
view, Huntington argues that there remains a fundamental source of
conflict in the world centred not on ideological or economic, but on
cultural difference. Furthermore, he argues that the basic divide will be
between the ‘West and the rest’, although he draws particular attention
to the ‘Confucian-Islamic’ connection. It is not hard to see how the
current understanding of  ‘terrorism’ is explained in these terms, as is
the emergence or re-emergence of  religious nationalism in India and
elsewhere in the postcolonial world.
In Africa, too, religion matters. Notably, only 0.8 per cent of  Africans
are non-religious, which probably makes the continent the most religious
in the world. Furthermore, some 394 640 000 or 46.3 per cent of  African
people are Christian; 344 920 000 or 40.5 per cent are Muslim; and
100 420 000 are followers of  ‘ethnic’ religions (White 1998). In South
Africa, too, the vast majority of  South Africans are religious. According
to the 2001 census, some 85 per cent of  South Africans are religious,
compared to 88 per cent in the 1996 census. Of  these, the vast majority
(nearly 80 per cent) report being Christian, with 33 per cent belonging
to ‘mainline’ churches and 32 per cent to Zionist or African Independent
Churches. According to Harald Froise (n.d.), since 1980 the African
Independent Churches have increased by 25 per cent, which makes them
the fastest growing sector of  Christianity. Of  the other religions, Islam
stands at 1.5 per cent and Hinduism at 1.2 per cent. Those who reported
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‘no religion’ stood at 15 per cent in 2001 (Stats SA 2004). In sum, it is
pretty clear that South Africa is both religious and predominantly
Christian.
The importance of  religion in South Africa is also reflected in the
number and significance of  faith-based organisations in civil society.
For example, an online search of  the national Department of  Social
Welfare non-profit organisation database reveals that of  the registered
organisations in the country, faith-based organisations constitute the fifth
highest of  seventeen categories at 4 814 or 12 per cent. Only the categories
of  ‘social services’, ‘development and housing’, ‘education and research’
and ‘health’ were higher.
In addition to being numerous, faith-based organisations have played –
and continue to play – a significant role in South African public life.
Already noted is the role of  the Dutch Reformed Church in justifying
Registered non-profit organisations according to the Department of Social Welfare
database.
Sector Number Per cent
1 Business and professional associations 15 0.04
2 Business and professional associations, unions 158 0.38
3 Culture and arts 1 0.00
4 Culture and recreation 480 1.15
5 Development and housing 9 728 23.27
6 Education 1 0.00
7 Education and research 6 579 15.74
8 Environment 590 1.41
9 Health 5 374 12.86
10 HIV/AIDS 2 0.00
11 International 49 0.12
12 Law, advocacy and politics 1 041 2.49
13 Not classified elsewhere 59 0.14
14 Philanthropic intermediaries 68 0.16
15 Philanthropic intermediaries and voluntarism promotion 480 1.15
16 Religion 4 814 11.52
17 Social services 12 358 29.57
Total 41 797 100.00
Source: Compiled from http://www.npo.gov.za/frmSNOrg.aspx, accessed 26 February 2009.
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apartheid and the mainstream Christian churches in, eventually, opposing
apartheid. In particular, the South African Council of  Churches (SACC)
and individuals, such as Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Catholic
Archbishop Denis Hurley, played high-profile roles as opponents of
apartheid. Indeed, Archbishop Tutu has continued his role as a com-
mentator on public life, in particular commenting on the conduct of
government when it fails to meet the normative standards of  human
rights, democracy and development.
Religion and quality
The issue of  quality refers to the potential role that faith-based
organisations could play in helping to democratise local governance in
South Africa. While recognising that not all faith-based organisations
are necessarily democratic, it is clear that the political theology of  the
major churches in South Africa is supporting of  advocacy for a more
active citizenship. Furthermore, such organisations have an additional
moral resource through their appeal to God’s authority that other civil
society organisations do not.
Around the world, faith-based organisations are increasingly seen as
having a legitimate role in democratic governance. Hence Veit Bader
argues that the extreme exclusion of  religious reasons and arguments in
liberal democracies is ‘morally arbitrary, unfair, and practically
counterproductive’ (2003: 265). Furthermore, the strict separation of
church and state in legal discourse has also come under attack (266).
Arguing that the church-state relationship is too narrow a concern, Bader
holds that we would do better to think of  a liberal-democratic institutional
landscape that consists of society-culture-politics-nation-state and
organised religions (266). He suggests that it is theoretically consistent
and perhaps pragmatically advisable to conceive of  an institutional context
that accommodates organised religion alongside the state. This he sees
as supplementing, rather than replacing, representative democracy (284).
Bader’s arguments are adventurous, but they confirm a growing
recognition among most scholars of  the constructive role that organised
religion or faith-based organisations can play in liberal and democratic
contexts.
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We do not need to go as far as Bader in arguments for institutionalising
religion into the system to affirm a democratic role for religion. As
scholars of  democracy and democratisation have long argued, a vibrant
civil society is crucial to democracy in at least two ways. First, it can act
as an alternative source of  organisational power, which can, in a
democratic context, pressurise the state to respond to social needs or
constrain abusive state actions. In a non-democratic context, such as the
apartheid and Soviet orders, civil society can be a source of  resistance to
oppression. Both the defiance campaign in South Africa in the late 1980s
and the so-called velvet revolution in the Czech Republic were driven by
civil society formations. Second, civil society organisation is a key source
of  social capital (networks and associated relations of  trust), which Robert
Putnam (1993) has argued undergirds the horizontal citizens relations
required for a meaningful democracy. A significant amount of  empirical
research has been done on the role that civil society organisations,
including religious organisations, play as schools for democracy. For
example, Michael A. Jones-Correa and David L. Leal (2001) found that
in the United States, Latino participation in elections and political
processes was positively influenced by membership of  churches.
While the association between political participation and civil society
organisations is widely accepted, not all civil society organisations
encourage democratic values or practices. There exists a clear distinction
in recent work on social capital and civil society organisations between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ civil society. There are different ways of  making this
distinction. For example, a common distinction is between ‘bridging’
and ‘bonding’ social capital. The former refers to associations that cross
social cleavages in their membership, the latter to associations that
reinforce social cleavages (Szreter 2002). The argument is that bridging
social capital is better for building the common identity and citizenship
required for effective democracy. Similarly, one could differentiate
between those organisations that explicitly affirm democratic values and
those that overtly oppose them.
These distinctions apply to religious organisations as much as to
other sectors in civil society. For example, while the role of  religion in
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democratisation has been mostly positive in the recent past, it is not
uniform. Huntington notes that the numbers of  Christians in Africa
grew from some 236 million in 1985 to 400 million by 2000 (1993: 281).
This is particularly important as the ‘third wave’ of  democratisation
between 1974 and 1990 was primarily a Catholic wave. Of  the 30 countries
that made the transition to democracy during this period, roughly 75 per
cent were Catholic. In addition, the growth of  popular religions is also
good for democracy as, according to Jean-Francois Bayart (1993), they
are the ordinary person’s way of  ‘cocking a snoot at authority’ (quoted in
Haynes 2004: 82). Similarly, Achille Mbembe (1998) argues that ‘the
current explosion of  religious revivalism in Africa is another ruse by the
common man to create a counter-ideology and alternative political space
in response to the totalitarian ambitions of African dictators’ (quoted in
Haynes 2004: 82).
However, the picture is not quite this simple. Not all popular religions
are pro-democracy and, as Jeff  Haynes points out, in Africa senior
religious figures have typically forged close relationships with the state,
usually for various pragmatic reasons, and the upshot has been to make
them ‘ambivalent towards the concept of  fundamental political change’
(2004: 87). Similarly in South Africa, while many establishment churches
did line up against apartheid, it took some time for this to happen. In
addition, the ruling whites-only NP regime justified its racist rule in
religious terms developed by the Dutch Reformed Church. Organised
religion thus found itself  on both sides of  the apartheid struggle, rather
than consistently on the side for democracy and human rights.
This noted, today the attitude of  faith-based organisations in South
Africa towards democracy is overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, despite
the widespread recognition of the differentiation of state and religion,
faith-based organisations retain tremendous potential to act as democratic
advocates because of  their political theology. In making this case, I follow
the distinction drawn by Daniel Philpott between, on the one hand,
‘differentiation’, which is the precise relationship between political and
religious institutions and, on the other hand, political theology, which is
the set of ideas a religious authority holds about legitimate political
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authority (2007: 505–07). I suggest that while religion and state are clearly
and consensually separated, most churches support human rights,
democracy and development. This enables a relatively easy distinction
between advocating for social or community upliftment based on human
rights, democracy and development and a simultaneous distancing from
politics, understood as the competition for power by parties also
committed to these same goals.
First, ‘differentiation’ refers to the balance of  power between potential
conflicting authority claims between religions that claim truth about the
moral order of  the universe and states that claim sovereignty over a
people and territory (Philpott 2007: 506). While there is a variety of
possible relationships between these competing authorities, from
theocracy at the one extreme to atheist dictatorship at the other, most
end up somewhere in between and can be categorised both as to how
separate church and state actually are and whether or not such separation
is mutually agreed on. Hence, while the apartheid order saw a low
integration of  state and church to the mutual consent of  both (although
not the majority of  people or all churches), post-apartheid South Africa
has a highly differentiated system to the consent of  most. Today the
Constitution affirms all religions and not only one; the state does not
promote religious purposes through law and policy; it does not restrict
freedom of religion; and no religious body has any special constitutional
standing.
Second, political theology is the set of  ideas that a religious authority
holds on what constitutes legitimate political authority (Philpott 2007:
505–07). As pointed out above, Catholicism is associated with the wave
of  democratisation in the world in the late twentieth century. Behind
this lies the new political theology of  the church following the second
Vatican Council of  1962–65, which affirmed human rights, religious
freedom, democracy and economic development. Similar commitments
exist today in other mainstream Christian churches, if  not in Islam. For
example, the Anglican Church declares on its website: ‘There are many
challenges and opportunities for ministry in this Province. For example,
the new democracy in South Africa after many years of oppression under
72 Religion and Spirituality in South Africa
the policy of  apartheid, in the rebuilding of  Angola and Mozambique
after many years of  civil war, the pandemic of  HIV & AIDS affecting
many of  its members, poverty eradication, environmental issues, etc.’
(Anglican Church of  Southern Africa 2009).
What this means is that despite the clear differentiation between
state and religion in South Africa, the political theology of  most churches
would probably justify social advocacy based on advancing human rights,
democracy and development, and would see these as community or social,
rather than political, issues. If  this assessment is correct, most faith-
based organisations in South Africa have unique normative resources to
justify supporting active forms of  citizenship, including social develop-
ment projects and rights-based education to empower local communities.
These normative resources matter especially in our context for two
reasons. First, it may well be the case that many ordinary people in South
Africa see public life in religious terms – at least in part. This is suggested
by Gerald West’s work in this volume on Thabo Mbeki’s increasing
reference to the Bible in his public speeches (see Chapter 3). It is also
suggested by work elsewhere in Africa. For example, Stephen Ellis and
Gerrie ter Haar argue that ‘religious modes of  thinking about the world
are widespread in Africa, and have a pervasive influence on politics in
the broadest sense’ (2007: 385). Indeed, they hold that Africa cannot be
properly understood without appeal to religious ideas that most people
embrace. In addition to challenging theories and analysis of  African social
life, this approach suggests that not only political institutions, but especially
political practice are already understood by many Africans from a religious
perspective. They further argue that many Africans feel powerless before
what are perceived as ‘vast forces that amount to something resembling
a cosmic conspiracy’. These forces have both a material and a spiritual
dimension (2007: 397). Implicit in the self-understanding of Africans is
that there must be a spiritual solution to what Westerners would view
solely as material problems.
The second reason why religion is especially important for democratic
advocacy in South Africa is the monopoly on political legitimacy enjoyed
by elites, thanks to the historical role of  the ANC in liberating South
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Africa from apartheid oppression. While this credibility is perhaps slowly
being white-anted from within in the light of  delivery and governance
failures, there can be little doubt that the ANC and, by extension, the
government feels an exclusive claim to represent the people. As identified
above, this attitude is often manifest in a very dismissive attitude towards
civil society, which is simply not perceived as politically legitimate enough
to question or demand. Faith-based organisations, however, have the
alternative and powerful moral resource of  God’s word to contest
attempts to exclude civil society on normative grounds.
Of  course, to say that the potential for justifying progressive advocacy
exists is not to say that it has been developed. This work still needs to be
done or at least developed in the public realm, as clearly there are already
many faith-based organisations doing democracy or development work
that may well have a more advanced theology of  social engagement. In
this sense, I echo a view developed by Ebrahim Rasool who laments the
failure of  post-apartheid religious organisations to develop a ‘theology
of  transformation’. He says:
We find religious organisations and institutions fighting battles
on various issues, but with no coherent sense. No one seems to
be crafting a theology of  transformation to guide us and bring
us together, as was the case with the theology of  liberation in
the Apartheid years . . . There must be some objective value that
we are guided by in our Scriptures, so that we speak with
conscience and not simply with the pragmatism of the moment.
We thus begin to spell out the complementary roles of  politics
and religion, without holding that religious activists should be
politicians, or that politicians should be religious activists, or that
they all have the same role (2002).
It is also important to recognise that the potential for social advocacy
and its successful realisation are two very different things. Hence Tanja
Winkler (2006) notes that even among faith-based organisations involved
in social development work in Johannesburg, there are significant
differences between those that organise around particular interests and
74 Religion and Spirituality in South Africa
affirm bonding practices and those that reach across social divisions in a
bridging manner. Consequently, the relationship between these various
faith-based organisations is often competitive, rather than co-operative.
Conclusion
Successful democratisation in South Africa requires more than regular
elections and economic growth. It also requires the active participation
of citizens in decisions that affect their material, political and cultural
lives, especially at the local level. The centralisation of  power in the
country, the poor performance of  local government, and the general
failure of  government’s invited spaces paint a somewhat bleak picture
of  an emergent breakdown in constructive local state-society relations
and an increasingly marginalised citizenry.
This chapter argues that faith-based organisations are uniquely placed
to be significant contributors to the revitalisation of  constructive local
state-society relations and a more active citizenship. Not only are most
South Africans religious, but faith-based organisations are many in number
and significant in influence. Most faith-based organisations have at their
disposal a political theology and a tradition grown out of  apartheid that
supports human rights, democracy and development and could thus form
the basis of  a theology of  active citizenship, without threatening the
legal and normative differentiation between state and religion. Lastly,
faith-based organisations have a unique legitimacy among civil society
organisations, which makes them less vulnerable to normative exclusion
by political elites. Of  course, more work is needed in developing the
theology of  active citizenship and many challenges face the substantive
realisation of  a successful advocacy practice, but the potential is clear.
Note
1. Section 152 of  the Constitution places an obligation on local government ‘to
encourage the involvement of  communities and community organisations in
the matters of  local government’. Further, section 195(e) states that ‘in terms
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of  the basic values and principles governing public administration – people’s
needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate
in policy-making’.
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